However, as we know GM went terribly wrong, because at some critical point they decided to “extend” their ranges, with Chevrolet gaining models more aimed at a higher-end clientele, like the Corvette, and Cadillac descending somewhat into a more consumer-orientated market. It didn’t take long to decide thereafter that by standardising components, frames, etc. they could build what was basically the same car using different external bodywork and brand it as a separate model, saving in their view manufacturing costs while maintaining the illusion of separate brands. This effectively blurred everything, and buyers weren’t fooled: it didn’t take long for most people to realise there wasn’t much point in buying, say, a Buick when you could get the exact same car as a Chevrolet for less money. Those who were more discriminating, meanwhile, equally well understood that a name like Cadillac now meant nothing, that if they wanted real luxury they needed to look to companies like Mercedes or BMW who had at least maintained a high-end manufacturing tradition. This is the risk that I think we all fear with Callebaut, that they may decide that in the interests of better economies of scale they ought to centralise bean buying, roasting, etc. As the GM case shows, this entirely misses the point: economies of scale are only relevant if the product in concern is undifferentiated. When clear differentiation exists, you have a different economy: the economy of market position. And unfortunately, once market position is given away, it is very, very difficult to recover. So let us hope Callebaut can see what is probably in their best interest: to keep the companies distinctly separate in fact as well as on the label, and save their strength for strategic planning rather that trying to manage everything centrally.